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panicular animals mayor may not care about. So, now

Response:

I will consider what sorts of things my cats care about.
I decided to adopt a pair of kittens about four years
ago. I thought it better to have two cats rather than one
since I believed that a solitary cat would be less happy
than a cat with a playmate. I agree with Russow that
using words like "happy" and "content" to describe
nonhuman animal behavior is, though scientifically
unmeasurable, still philosophically justifiable. When I
went to the Omaha Humane Society to see a litter of
six-week-old kittens they had told me about over the
phone, I was shown a litter of four kittens, three females
and a male. Since I thought I could not easily manage
four growing cats, I decided to adopt the three females
while hoping that someone else would adopt the male.
Thus, my frrst decision was to separate the orphaned
siblings. Did the three sisters care about being separated
from their brother? All four kittens were mewing loudly
at the time, which I interpreted as distress, but perhaps
their distress was due to their uncomfortable surroundings
at the Humane Society or the previous loss of their
mother, and not their separation from their brother.
Soon after bringing the three kittens home, I tried
to put small collars with their identification tags on
them. They reacted by (frantically?) leaping about,
arching their necks, and struggling to pull the collars
off with their paws. I inferred from this behavior that
they didn't much care for the collars, and so I promptly
removed them. A week or two later, one of the kittens
began to have diarrhea My veterinarian diagnosed her
as suffering from a gastro-intestinal infection, and he
supplied me with medicine for her. Sadly, the
medication failed to cure her ailment. Despite my
efforts, she stopped eating entirely, became very weak
in a short time, and died on a Sunday evening before I
could take her to the vet the next morning. Had the
unfortunate kitten stopped caring about food? Hours
before she died, her two sisters huddled with her just
as they had often done before when all three were
healthy. Did the two surviving kittens care about their
sister dying? I could not judge either way from their
behavior since they neither attended closely to the dead
kitten nor avoided it in any obvious way. They simply
seemed to ignore it.
As is usually the case, the two cats, Bryseis and
Chryseis, developed quite distinct personalities. Bryseis,
the more athletic cat, exhibits a strong interest in
exploring the basement, going outside, and drinking
from sinks, the toilet, and the tub. Chryseis, in contrast,
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In her paper, "What Do Animals Care About?," LillyMarlene Russow argues for two theses. The frrst is that
the arguments of Frey and Leahy fail to establish that
animals do not have interests in a morally relevant sense.
I think she is successful in defending this thesis. Less
convincing is her second thesis, namely, that we are
better off focusing on the question of what animals
care about than continuing to speak of the interests
that animals have. While Russow's criticisms of
behaviorism are persuasive, she offers no compelling
grounds to accept her suggestion that computers might
well have desires. Since computers lack nervous
systems and are not conative organisms, it seems
implausible to think they have desires. Russow is also
too casual in assuming that we can simply set aside
extreme skepticism. She gives no hint of how this can
be done in a philosophically adequate way. But the main
question I want to focus on is: What do specific
nonhuman animals specifically care about?
Let me begin by reflecting in some detail on
Russow's claim that "The undeniable fact is that
experienced observers can tell quite well when an
animal is happy." I am trained as a professional
philosopher and not as a professional cat-handler, but I
do fancy myself an experienced observer of feline
behavior since I have lived with two cats for about
thirteen years of my life. I think that for any
investigation of what animals care about, it is important
to address specific, concrete examples of what
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seems not to care about the basement, the out-of-doors,
or drinking from places other than her water bowl;
Chryseis cares much more about being fed canned rather
than dry cat food. Do I have a moral obligation to let
Bryseis go outside? Making them wear collars as kittens
seemed to make them quite unhappy. So, since Bryseis
still remains collarless and untagged, I am reluctant to
let her become an "outdoor" cat. If I allowed her to
roam free in my neighborhood, I would expose her to
the risk of fights with other animals, serious injury, or
even death from being struck by an automobile. Am I
justified in seriously restricting her liberty as I do?
Cats are predators, after all, and her telos as a cat
certainly includes sniffmg outdoor scents, stalking birds,
chasing insects, and hunting small herbivores.
Therefore, she might well be more content freely
exploring the outdoor environment for hours every day
than staying indoors all but a few minutes every week
when I closely supervise her limited excursions
outdoors. Does Bryseis care about living a long, safe
life indoors? Or would she be much happier roaming
the neighborhood unimpeded by my paternalistic,
protectionist interference? Would she return home if I
let her outside on her own? And if she did not, would
she be happier as a stray? How am I to interpret her
behavior so as reasonably to judge what would make
her happiest? Would there be, to use Russow's words,
"a high degree of intersubjective agreement, at least
among skilled, trained. experienced practitioners" about
what would most contribute to Bryseis' happiness?
Consider another behavior. My cats have developed
the all too common "vice" of clawing the furniture,
despite my conscientious efforts to trim their claws
regularly. If I decided never to allow them outside on
their own, then they would never need their claws to
defend themselves from attack by hostile animals. Do
cats care about being declawed?
Another element of the telos of cats is surely to
reproduce. Do female cats care about being spayed?
Are feline mothers who nurture kittens happier than
their spayed sisters? Do male cats care about being
neutered? Are promiscuous tomcats happier than their
neutered, more docile brothers? Or do we have a
paternalistic justification for spaying and neutering dogs
and cats in order to minimize the nmnber, and the usual
suffering, of strays?
Russow suggests that "a definitive criterion of what
we care about (as opposed to what we think we care
about) is that it contributes to our happiness or alleviates
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our unhappiness." Given the behavior my cats exhibit
when I am away from home for long periods of time,
surely they would be happier, and not just think
themselves happier, were I to spend more time at home
with them. Does this suffice to establish that I have a
prima facie duty to spend more time at home with my
cats? Russow proposes the following definition: lOS
cares about 0 if and only if S directly desires 0, and
getting or achieving 0 contributes to S's happiness."
This definition seems inadequate for two reasons.
First, while it may seem to capture our ordinary concept
of caring about inanimate objects, I think it fails to
describe our ordinary concept of caring about other
sentient subjects. Many humans, and perhaps many
intelligent nonhuman animals as well, care about other
sentient beings for their own sakes, and not only because
the company of those subjects contributes to the
happiness of the individual who is doing the caring. I
offer the following definition of intersubjective caring:
S 1 cares about S2 if and only if S 1 desires to
promote the happiness or well-being of S2'
whether SI and S2 are conspecifics or sentient
beings of different species.
Let us return to my stock example. Do my cats care
about each other (and me) in the same sort of way that
they care about being fed canned cat food and having a
clean litterbox? If so, then when they play with each
other they care about each other the same sort of way
they care about a paper clip or a pair of socks when
they play with these things. I am not inclined to construe
their caring about each other so narrowly. They exhibit
reciprocal altruism when they groom each other. Such
reciprocal altruism suggests to me that they may well
care about each other's well-being to some extent. That
is, Bryseis may well care about the subject Chryseis,
an individual with her own well-being, rather than
merely caring about the object Chryseis, a thing that
contributes to Bryseis' happiness.
The second reason to hesitate accepting Russow's
definition of "caring about" is that she is imposing it as
a stipulative definition that does not, in fact, "accord
well with our ordinary concept of caring about" even
when "0" refers exclusively to objects. For example, I
could on some occasion care about having some .
cheesecake. Later, after I find and eat a piece of
cheesecake, I could well discover that having it did not
make me happy but, rather, made me sad for failing to
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keep to my diet. It would be wrong to say in retrospect
that I didn't really care about having the cheesecake in
the first place. Rather, we should say I no longer care
about having more cheesecake because, having
committed dietary sin, I now care more about returning
to my diet. In short, I do not see how Russow's
distinction between "caring about" and "thinking we
care about" does more work than the distinction between
"taking an interest in" and "successfully promoting
one's self-interest." To say that smokers take an interest
in smoking, but smoking is not really in their selfinterest, strikes me as more in accord with our ordinary
concepts than saying that smokers think they care about
smoking, but do not really care, since smoking does
not contribute to their long-term happiness. Similarly,
to say that my cat Bryseis takes an interest in roaming
free outside, but roaming free outside is not really in
her self-interest, makes more sense to me than to say
that Bryseis thinks she cares about roaming free outside,
but she does not really care, since it probably endangers
her long-term happiness.
Russow has made a decent attempt to advance the
discussion of how best to talk about animals' interests,
desires, and happiness. However, her proposed
defmition of "caring about" fails to mark the qualitative
difference between caring about an object and caring
about a subject and does not, in fact, accord well with
our ordinary concept of caring about generally.
Moreover, since Russow's discussion is deficient at the
theoretical level on these points, its application to
questions about specific animals-for example, whether
housecats care about being allowed to stray outside,
being spayed or neutered, etc.-is not promising.
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I could respond by answering Professor Stephens'
specific questions about his cats: either offering a
judgment about what they do and don't care about, or
explaining what one would do to determine that. But
that would fill up all the remaining time, and miss his
deeper concerns. Instead, I'll say just a few words about
two more general concerns that he raises, either
explicitly or implicitly:
(1) how we can determine the object of intentional

states, including caring, and
(2) why "caring about" is an improvement over talk
about interests.
I take it that the philosophical issue underlying
Stephens' questions about what his cats care about in
specific incidents is the concern that there may be no
legitimate way of answering these questions. The full
answer to his concern would be too complicated to lay
out in detail-not because he's asking about cats, but
because specifying the object of any mental state is a
complicated business. Nonetheless, I'll try to indicate
some of the factors that should be involved.
First, sometimes de re specifications of mental states
are the most appropriate ones. That is to say, we can
say that Chryseis believes of Stephens that he is a source
of food, without claiming or being committed to
anything about how he is "represented." The same is
true of other propositional attitudes, especially caring
about. Thus, it is certainly reasonable, and perhaps even
necessary, at times to read "Chryseis cares about
Stephens" as a de re attitude.
Even if there is good reason to demand a de dicto
account of a mental state, there still may be good
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